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NOTES

TESTERS STANDING UP FOR TITLE III

OF THE ADA
One of the things Americans cherish most is autonomy. We want
choices and the ability to make them on our own, without interference
from anything or anyone. Each and every day we make choices;
where to eat, buy gas, or shop for groceries, what movies theaters or
playhouses to visit-the list is endless. This ability to choose is an
integral aspect of being an American, yet millions of Americans lack
this freedom due to disability.
Imagine being paralyzed from the waist down and having to rely
on a wheelchair for mobility. You stop at a restaurant, only to find
out that there is no ramp to get into the establishment, so you politely
ask those you are with to lift you up as numerous other patrons
watch and point. Then, the hostess escorts you to a table. You
struggle to maneuver your wheelchair through the narrow aisles only
to realize that the tables are too low for your wheelchair to fit. The
manager apologizes, inadvertently making a scene as you decide to
just leave. You stop at the restroom before leaving, but it is not
handicapped-accessible. Then when you try to wash your hands the
sink is too high up, and as you strain to lift yourself out of the
wheelchair you slip causing injury to your arms. You leave the
restaurant embarrassed and frustrated, knowing that you can never go
back to that restaurant again.
As a result, the ability to choose has been taken away-you no
longer have the choice to visit a restaurant frequented by your friends
and family. This scenario is unfortunately the reality that some people
are forced to face as a result of public accommodations failing to
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comply with Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act
Congress passed the ADA in 1990 to fix a serious problemnamely, the seclusion of people with disabilities resulting in explicit
and implicit discrimination .2 It was called the ...
20th Century
Emancipation Proclamation for all persons with disabilities."" Title
III of the ADA contained broad language covering numerous public
accommodations; both new construction and existing facilities were
required by the statute to remove barriers to access. 4 The disabled
population hoped that, as a result of the ADA, their lives would no
longer be shaped by limited access and the inability to choose.'
However, reality-a lack of compliance with the ADA and severe
underenforcement of the statute-soon destroyed this hope.6
Eighteen years after the passage of the ADA, numerous facilities
are still not compliant 7 leaving the disabled population in a secondclass citizenship limbo. Title III of the ADA allows both the U.S.
Attorney General 8 and private individuals to sue,9 but the rate at
which both the Attorney General and individuals are bringing suit
seeking compliance is extremely low. 10 The Department of Justice's
Disability Section, tasked with ADA enforcement, is understaffed,
and many individuals are dissuaded from bringing suits because of
the statute's complexity."1
I See, e.g., Bruni v. FMCO, L.L.C., No. 2:06-cv-293-FtM-29SPC, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1864 1, at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 16, 2007) (discussing how a plaintiff was denied access
due to barriers and dangerous conditions in violation of Title 111).
2 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 28-29 (1990).
3D. Russell Hymas & Brett R. Parkinson, Comment, Architectural Barriers Under the
ADA: An Answer to the Judiciary's Struggle with Technical Non-Compliance, 39 CAL. W. L.
REV. 349, 350 (2003) (quoting 136 CONG. REc. 17,369 (1990) (statement of Sen. Tom Harkin))
(discussing how facilities have failed to comply with the ADA by not removing physical
barriers that impede access).
4See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a) (2000) (stating that individuals with disabilities should have
the same access to public accommodations as those without disabilities).
5See Elizabeth Keadle Markey, Note, The ADA's Last Stand?: Standing and the
Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 185 (2002) (arguing for a more lenient
standard for standing under the ADA).
6 Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies: The Case of
"Abusive" ADA Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (discussing the need for private
enforcement in Title III of the ADA and the fact that the limitations courts are placing on ADA
plaintiffs are causing abusive litigation).
7 Id
8 42 U.S.C.

§ 12188(b).
9Id. § 12188(a).
10See Ruth Colker, ADA Title III: A Fragile Compromise, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 377, 381 (2000) (discussing how Title III has been unsuccessful in remedying the lack of
accommodation for people with disabilities in public places).
1"See, e.g., Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 763 (D. Or. 1997)
("Plaintiffs also have the incentive and resources to prosecute an action such as this, which often
is not the case with an individual suite guest, especially one from out-of-town who may have no
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Clearly the enforcement mechanism for Title III is inadequate,
resulting in continued discrimination against people with disabilities.
The answer to the problem of underenforcement may lie in tester
standing. Testers are qualified individuals with disabilities who visit
places of public accommodation to determine their compliance with
Title 111.12 Testers have historically been used to uncover housing and
employment discrimination, 3 but recently these individuals are taking
on roles as private attorneys general in an attempt to increase
compliance with Title III. These testers go out to places of public
accommodation in an effort to "test" a facility's accessibility against
the statutory mandates of the ADA. If a facility is not accessible, then
the testers file lawsuits for injunctive relief, forcing the businesses to
comply with the ADA. While these suits seem like a simple and
effective solution, federal courts have been extremely skeptical of
testers as plaintiffs and have dismissed many of the testers' cases for
lack of standing.14
This Note will explore the problems that arise as a result of the
decisions that deny testers standing to sue under the ADA. Despite
the skepticism about tester standing, courts should allow testers to
bring Title III lawsuits, as it is the only way to finally bring the
change intended under the ADA. Part I will discuss the intricacies of
the standing doctrine. Part II will highlight the history of tester
standing in cases brought under other civil rights statutes, specifically
the Fair Housing Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Part III will detail the function of an ADA tester and chronicle the
case law addressing tester standing under the ADA. Finally, Part IV
will present the arguments in support of tester standing.

plans to ever return to Portland.").
12 See Lucibello v. McGinley, No. 2:07-cv-217-FtM-34SPC, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10433, at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2008).
13 See EEOC NOTICE No. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: WHETHER "TESTERS" CAN
FILE CHARGES AND LITIGATE CLAIMS OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (1996), available at

http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/testers.html [hereinafter EEOC NOTICE].
14 See, e.g., Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077 (1lth Cir. 2001); Harris v. Stonecrest Care
Auto Ctr., LLC, 472 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (S.D. Cal. 2007); Cross v. Boston Mkt. Corp., No.
07cv486J (LSP), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39407 (S.D. Cal. May 30, 2007); Wilson v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (S.D. Cal. 2006); Moss v. Comfort Inn Woodland Hills,
No. CV04-7939FMC (Mcx), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81429 (C.D. Cal. 2006), af'd, 275 F.
App'x 717 (9th Cir. 2008); Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 359 F. Supp. 2d 924 (C.D. Cal.
2005), affd sub nom. Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 594 (2008); Molski v. Kahn Winery, 381 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (C.D. Cal. 2005),
affid sub nom. Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 594 (2008); Rodriguez v. Investco, L.L.C., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (M.D. Fla. 2004);
Brother v. Tiger Partner, LLC, 331 F. Supp.2d 1368 (M.D. Fla. 2004); Moreno v. G & M Oil
Co., 88 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
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1. THE ABYSS THAT IS THE STANDING DOCTRINE
The standing doctrine satisfies Article III of the Constitution's
"6case or controversy" requirement 5 as a gloss that the Supreme Court

has put on Article

111,16

making it a requirement for any party that

seeks to invoke federal jurisdiction. 17 A plaintiff must show he or she
has '''alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy'
as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify
exercise of the court's remedial powers on his behalf."'18 Standing is a
limitation on judicial power, and, therefore, a court can address it at
any stage without motion by either party. 19 While this seems like a
straightforward inquiry, that is the farthest thing from the truth.
Scholars have consistently noted "'the law of standing has for some
time been the one of the most criticized aspects of constitutional
law."' 20 Authors have gone as far as to call the standing doctrine
..incoheren[t],"' and "inappropriate."2 This criticism is in response
to the federal courts continually raising and lowering the "standing
hurdle," demonstrating judicial manipulation of the doctrine.2
The federal courts' inconsistent analyses make it difficult to
determine what is required for a plaintiff to have standing to sue.
However, standing requirements have generally been divided into
constitutional and judicially created prudential categories.2

'5 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) ("[T~he core component
of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article

II.)16 See id.
17

See id at 5 61.

Is Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204

(1962)).
19Markey, supra note 5, at 19 1.
20 Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For, 93 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1664 n.1
(2007) (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 390 (3d ed. 2000))
(detailing some of the criticisms of the standing doctrine and applying an economic analysis to
standing to demonstrate how the standing doctrine serves the purpose of efficiency).
21 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 60 (3d ed. 2006)).
22 Abram Chayes, Foreword:Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L.

REv. 4, 8(1982).
23 Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L.
REv. 635, 637-44 (1985) (discussing the erratic treatment of the standing doctrine, specifically
focusing on the Supreme Court's decision in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), which
limited standing based on a separation of powers concern).
24 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (explaining that although
some of the elements of standing "express merely prudential considerations that are part of
judicial self-government, the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of
the case-or-controversy requirement of Article 111").
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A. ConstitutionalRequirementsfor Standing
The Supreme Court articulated that Article III of the Constitution
contains three requirements for standing.2 A plaintiff must first
establish a case or controversy by alleging an "injury in fact" that is
"concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent, not
conjectural.",26 The particularized requirement means that the injury
must affect the plaintiff in an individual and personal way.2 Second,
a causal connection must be present between the alleged injury and
the conduct of the defendant. Specifically, "the injury has to be 'fairly
.. trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ...
th~e] result [o]the independent action off some third party- not before
the court."' 28 Finally, it must be likely, rather than speculative, that
the "'injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision", 2 9 These
three requirements are the constitutional minimum, not merely
pleading requirements .3 0 The Supreme Court has stated that the
requirements are "an indispensable part of the plaintiffs case."3
Therefore, the plaintiff bears the same burden of proof for the
standing requirements as is necessary for all other evidence at each
stage of the litigation.3
While these three requirements seem logical and easy to analyze,
one can question whether this straightforward formula tries to
simplify a very complicated and fact-specific analysis too much,
thereby disregarding the intricacies of the case or controversy
analysis . 33 This three-part inquiry overlaps with other concerns of
separation of powers, enforcement, and judicial accountability.3
Professor Gene Nichol argues that the result draws "[lines . . . that
3
can't be sustained, or even understood." 1

25

See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
28 Id. (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976))
(alterations in original).
29 Id at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id
33 Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standingfor Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L.
REv. 301. 302-04 (2002) (arguing the injury standard has resulted in incomprehensible and
irreconcilable federal court decisions on standing).
34 Id.at304.
35 Id.
26
27
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B. PrudentialRequirementsfor Standing
In addition to the constitutional requirements for standing, courts
have created further conditions for standing.3 These requirements
make the standing analysis even more incomprehensible and
extremely malleable. Three prudential requirements arise frequently.
First, a plaintiff cannot allege a "generalized grievance," because
courts refuse to hear a case where a plaintiff is affected in the same
way as all other citizens.3 Additionally, a plaintiff cannot assert the
rights of a third party. 38 Finally, a plaintiffs claim must "fall within
'the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
39
constitutional guarantee in question."'
The constitutional and judicially created standing requirements
create a maze that plaintiffs must navigate to avoid dismissal. As this
Note will later highlight, tester standing under the ADA involves an
additional layer of fog.
C. Special Issue: Requirementfor Standing in Cases Seeking
Injunctive Relief
Beyond the constitutional and prudential standing requirements, a
plaintiff seeking injunctive relief in federal court must satisfy the
prerequisite the Supreme Court laid out in City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons 40 a case where the plaintiff was placed in a chokehold after a
traffic stop. The plaintiff sought an injunction that would prevent the
police from utilizing chokeholds, but the Court denied his request for
equitable relief, articulating a specific requirement for standing in
injunctive relief cases, which the plaintiff had failed to meet .4 ' The
Court in Lyons established the rule that ...[p]ast exposure to illegal
conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy
regarding injunctive relief. ...if unaccompanied by any continuing,
present adverse effects.,, 4 2 Because injunctive relief concerns future
conduct, in order to fulfill the present case or controversy
requirement, a plaintiff must demonstrate that "he 'has sustained or is

See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
38 Id
39 Valley Forge Christian Coil. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464,475 (1982) (quoting Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camnp, 397 U.S. 150, 153
(1970)).
40 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
41 Id. at 110-11.
42 Id at 102 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974)) (alterations in
original).
36

37
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immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury."A Further,
the "injury must be both 'real and immediate,' not 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical."'"4 The Court rationalized that past wrongs do not
satisfy the requirement for "real and immediate threat of injury."4
While plaintiffs may claim that they fear future injury, the Court's
requirement focused on the reality of the threat, not the plaintiffs'
subjective concern.4 The interplay between Title III cases and the
standard articulated in Lyons is particularly important and will be
examined later in this Note.
11. TESTER STANDING IN OTHER CIVIL

RIGHTS CASES

The use of testers has become common practice in the enforcement
of other civil rights statutes, such as the Fair Housing Act ("FHA")
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.~ Scholars label testing
as a useful practice to uncover cases of discrimination .4 Numerous
successful testing programs exist to aid in the enforcement of the
FHA . 49 For ten years the Department of Justice has run a successful
fair housing testing program.5 0 Federal and state governmental
agencies use testers to detect employment discrimination under Title
VII, such as the tester program initiated by the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance and Programs."1
The Supreme Court addressed standing for testers in what is likely
the most significant case in this area, Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman. 2 In Havens Realty housing testers and the organization that
employed them brought suit alleging racial steering practices (i.e.,
directing possible home buyers interested in similar properties to
Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)).
Id. (quoting Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1969); United Pub. Workers of
Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-91 (1947)).
45 Id. at 103.
46 Id. at 107.
47 See EEOC NOTICE, supra note 13 (discussing the common use of testers in identify'ing
discriminatory practices and these testers' ability to bring suit under civil rights laws if they arc
subjected to discrimination during the course of their work).
48 Id.
49 Stephen E. Haydon, Comment, A Measure of Our Progress: Testing for Race
Discriminationin Public Accommodations, 44 UCLA L. R~v. 1207, 1235-40 (1997) (reviewing
the arguments for tester standing in housing discrimination cases).
50 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Mend It, Don't End It 14 (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Sch. of Law
Faculty Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 07-04-05, 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract--98 1927; see also Department of Justice Oversight: Hearing Before the
. Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 309-10 (2006) (prepared statement of Alberto R.
Gonzales, Attorney General, Department of Justice) (discussing his civil rights initiative, a
housing discrimination testing program called Operation Home Sweet Home).
51 EEOC NOTICE, supra note 13 (citing EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION REPORT (B3NA),
Vol. 6, No. 6, at 142-43 (Feb. 7, 1996)).
52 455 U.S. 363 (1982).
43

44
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different areas based on their race) in violation of the FHA .53 A
unanimous Supreme Court held that the testers and the organization
had standing to sue for monetary damages and injunctive relief under
the FHA, finding "[the fact t]hat the tester may have approached the
real estate agent hilly expecting that he would receive false
information, and without any intention of buying or renting a home,
does not negate the simple fact of injury. . ... The Court employed
a broad test for standing, recognizing that Congress intended standing
under the FHA to "extend to the full limits of Art. Il.""
The civil rights movement has a long history of using testers to
uncover discrimination in the employment context as well.5 Tester
lawsuits under Title VII have received endorsement from the U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,5 which issued a notice
stating: "[T]esters (persons who apply for employment for the
purpose of testing for discriminatory hiring practices, but do not
intend to accept such employment), and the organizations that send
testers to respondents, may challenge any discrimination to which
they were subjected while conducting the tests. 8 Employment
discrimination testers are viewed as a usefuil tool to uncover subtle
employment discrimination, especially in low-skill and entry-level
positions.5
However, case law is mixed in connection with tester standing
under Title VII because there seems to be more contention with
employment testers.6 Opponents of employer testing usually argue
that testers have not suffered an injury because they voluntarily
subjected themselves to the harm. 61In Fair Employment Council of
53

Id. at 368-70.

54

Id. at 374; see also Haydon, supra note 49, at 1212.
Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 372 (internal quotation marks omitted).
EEOC NOTICE, supra note 13.

55
56

57 Id
58 Id
59 Daniel M. Tardiff, Comment, Knocking on the Courtroom Door: Finally an Answer
From Within for Employment Testers, 32 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 909, 927 (2001) (citing Michael J.
Yelnosky, Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers to Uncover and Remedy Discrimination
in Hiring for Lower-Skilled, Entry-Level Jobs, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 403, 410, 411, 413
(1993)).
60 See, e.g., Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc. v. BMG Mktg. Corp., 28
F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cit. 1994) (denying standing to testers who were no longer employed by the
tester organization, but granting standing to the organization); Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi,
895 F.2d 1521, 1526 (7th Cir. 1990) (denying tester standing); Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co.,
585 F.2d 625 (4th Cir. 1978) (stating that whether an application is bona fide is relevant in
determining standing); Panr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 65 7 F. Supp. 1022 (M.D.
Ga. 1987) (denying standing to a tester plaintiff challenging employment discrimination).
61 Michelle Landever, Note, Tester Standing in Employment DiscriminationCases Under
42 USC. § 1981, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 381, 393 (1993) (citing Roderic V. 0. Boggs et al., Use
of Testing in Civil Rights Enforcement, in CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE: MEASUREMENT
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Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC Marketing Corp.,,62 a district court
established a clear precedent against Title VII tester standing, ruling
that the testers were prevented from seeking injunctive relief because
they cannot argue the possibility of future injury.6 The BMC court
decided that since the plaintiffs were no longer employed as testers
and they were known to the defendant company as testers, there was
no possibility that they would ever again apply for employment with
the defendant.64 As another court conmmented: "[Testers] are
investigators; they suffer no harm other than that which they invite in
order to make a case against the persons investigated . . .. The idea
that their legal rights have been invaded seems an arch-formalism." 6 5
Despite the negative precedent, other courts have found that Title
VII testers should be afforded standing. Two courts suggested that the
primary motives of the plaintiffs should not be considered in the
standing analysis 6. The argument is that Title VII does not require a
person to have an actual desire to work for the employer in order to
bring a claim under the statute.6 Courts also support the idea that
individuals should function as "private attorneys general," and,
therefore, that Title VII allows such individuals to enforce the statute
through civil actions.6 Courts also focus on the similarities between
Title V11 and the FHA, noting that the testers in Havens Really did
not want the housing, just like the employment testers did not wish to
receive a job out of their testing efforts.6
Those who believe Title V11 testers deserve standing argue that the
language in the statute, which says "persons aggrieved," eliminates
the need for a plaintiff to fulfill judicially created requirements for
standing. 70 This is based on the rationale in Trafficante v.

OF DISCRIMINATION INAMERICA 345 (Michael Fix & Raymond Struyk eds., 1993)).
62 28 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
63 Id. at 1274.
64 Id. at 1273-74.
65 Bellwood, 895 F.2d at 1526 (denying tester standing because the congressional grant of
standing was more expansive under the FHA).
66 Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2000); Molovinsky v. Fair
Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc., 683 A.2d 142 (D.C. 1996).
67 Anthony F. Spalvieri, Note, Employment Testers: Obstacles Standing in the Way of
Standing Under § 1981 and Title VII, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 753, 784 (2002) (discussing
arguments for allowing tester standing under Title VII).
68 See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968); Schobert v.
1ll. Dep't of Transp., 304 F.3d 725, 735 (7th Cir. 2002) ("[A] civil rights plaintiff may act as a
'private attorney general vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest
importance."' (quoting Dunning v. Simmons Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 1995)));
Kyles, 222 F.3d at 300.
69 Kyles, 222 F.3d at 297-99.
10 Spalvieri, supra note 67, at 767 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (c), (0(l) (2000)).
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Metropolitan Life Insurance Cc., 7 ' in which the Supreme Court held
that the FHA's language of "'person claiming to be aggrieved"'
demonstrated ""'a congressional intention to define standing as
72
broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.""'.
Therefore, a Title VII tester need only satisfy the standing
requirements contained in Article 111.73 When courts, such as the court
in BMC, focus on the motivation of a plaintiff for bringing a lawsuit,
they are arguably adding an additional hurdle a plaintiff must
overcome to secure standing in federal court. Nothing in the Supreme
Court's standing requirements focuses on a plaintiff's motivation for
filing a lawsuit. In fact, the Supreme Court's analysis focuses on
injury in fact, not subjective intentions.
Overall attitudes are favorable towards FHA testers since Havens
Realty. While Title VII testers have met some skepticism, the courts
have continually recognized the importance of testers and their ability
to uncover discrete acts of discrimination that the remedial statutes
were enacted to combat. The important point is that Title VII testers
have at least had the opportunity to have their cases heard, an
opportunity consistently denied to ADA testers.
111. ADA

TESTERS

A. W"at is a Title IJIADA Tester?

Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against disabled
individuals in numerous places of public accommodation. The
purpose of the ADA is to provide the disabled population with access
to public places in order to integrate a population that was once
plagued with segregation and seclusion.7 The key provision reads:
"No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability
in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or
operates a place of public accommodation. 7 5 Title III requires
accessibility of statutorily covered facilities through the removal of

409 U.S. 205 (1972).
Spalvieri, supra note 67, at 767 (quoting Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209 (quoting Hackett
v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442,446 (3d Cir. 1971))).
71
72

73

Idat768.

74

H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 28-29 (1990).
42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000).

75
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architectural barriers when doing so is "readily achievable."7 The Act
defines discrimination to include:
[A] failure to take such steps as may be necessary to ensure
that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied
services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than
other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and
services, unless the entity can demonstrate that taking such
steps would fundamentally alter the nature of the good,
service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation
7
being offered or would result in an undue burden.
Therefore, failure by a public accommodation to remove any
architectural and/or communication barriers that are structural in
nature is likely a violation of the statute.7 Public accommodations
are private entities whose operations fall into the non-exclusive
categories listed in the statute. 79 Title III also covers "[~a]ny person
that offers examinations or courses related to applications, licensing,
certification, or credentialing for secondary or postsecondary
education, professional, or trade purposes."8
In return for the broad coverage of facilities in Title III, the section
included a limited set of remedies.8 Compensatory damages are not
available under Title 111, leaving private parties with only injunctive
relief and attorneys' fees. 82 Another limit on remedies is that plaintiffs
must be a "prevailing party" in order to recover attorneys' fees.8
ADA testers seek to uncover facilities in violation of Title 111.
These individuals are part of the class of people protected by the
ADA, many of them in wheelchairs, paralyzed, deaf, or blind.8 A
tester routinely visits places of public accommodation such as
restaurants, movie theaters, or gas stations to check compliance with
Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).
Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
78 Id
79 Id. § 12181(7).
- Id § 12189.
81 See Colker, supra note 10, at 387.
76
77

42 U.S.C. § 12188.
Id. § 12205.
84 See, e.g., Access 4 All, Inc. v. Chi. Grande, Inc., No. 06-C-5250, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 35304, at *4 (N.D. 1ll. May 10, 2007) (plaintiff suffered from quadriplegia); D'Lil v.
Best W. Encina Lodge & Suites, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1049 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (physically
disabled plaintiff required wheelchair for mobility), rev'd, 538 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2008),
petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3449 (Feb. 3, 2009) (No. 08-993); Molski v. Mandarin
Touch Rest., 359 F. Supp. 2d 924, 926 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (physically disabled plaintiff relied on
wheelchair), affid sub fnin. Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047 (9th Cit. 2007),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 594 (2008); Brother v. Tiger Partner, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1369
(M.D. Fla. 2004) (plaintiff was deaf and paralyzed in one leg).
82
83
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the ADA. One court provided a detailed explanation of the testing
process:
As a "tester" he utilizes a routine practice when he visits
places of public accommodation: "he engages all of the
barriers to access, or at least all of those that he is able to
access; and he tests all of those barriers to access to determine
whether and the extent to which they are illegal barriers to
access; he proceeds with legal action to enjoin such
discrimination .... ,8
The testers attempt to use the facilities in the same way as a person
without a disability.8 A tester will visit these establishments to
ensure there are appropriate accommodations-such as ramps for
wheelchairs, Braille on elevators and doors, and handicappedaccessible restrooms and hotel rooms-and to look for barriers to
access that are likely illegal. Often testers return to the place to check
its compliance after a complaint is filed. Many testers perform these
tests during the normal course of their life: they stop at a gas station
to get gas and, while there, they attempt to use a restroom or get into
the convenience store to buy a snack, or try to rent a hotel room for
the night after a long trip.88 Other testers travel to places both near to
and far from their homes to test the facilities. In one case a tester
traveled to numerous restaurants in one day and ended up filing suit
against each one. 89 Numerous non-profit organizations also seek
individuals with disabilities to participate in their testing programs.
For example, Access Living encourages individuals with disabilities
to talk to its testing coordinator if they are interested in becoming a
tester.9 Another group, Access Now, Inc., asks individuals with
disabilities who are frustrated with access barriers to join class action
8Bni v. FMCO, L.L.C., No. 2:06-cv-293-FtM-29SPC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18641,
at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 16, 2007) (quoting Complaint, Bruni, No. 2:06-cv-293-FtM-295PC)
(allowing standing for a tester who found numerous ADA violations at defendant's facility).
86

87

Id
See, e.g., Disability Advocates & Counseling Group, Inc. v. Betancourt, No. 05-CIV-

60740-COOKIE/BROWN, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38939, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 7, 2005)
(denying standing to plaintiff who returned to public accommodation to assess the facility's
compliance or noncompliance with the ADA).
88 See Disability Advocates & Counseling Group, Inc. v. 4SK, Inc., No. 6:04-cv-327-Orl3 lJGG, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44389, at *4-5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2005) (while out of town for
a deposition, plaintiff, who used a wheelchair for mobility, was given a hotel room without
wheelchair accessibility).
89 Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 347 F. Supp. 2d 860, 864-65 (C.D. Cal. 2004), affd
sub nom. Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129
S. Ct. 594 (2008).
90 Access Living, http://www.accessliving.org/Civil-Rights.htmn (last visited Jan. 10,
2008).
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suits the organization has filed, even offering guidance to help such
individuals become comfortable with the idea of being plaintiffs. 91
ADA testers are different from testers used in other civil rights
contexts, because they are patrons who are attempting to use the
facilities and the services offered. While the primary intention of the
tester is to review the establishments for compliance with the ADA,
the tester is generally visiting the establishment as both a patron and a
private attorney general for the ADA by checking on compliance with
Title III of the ADA on behalf of themselves as well as other people
with disabilities. It is important to note that, while ADA testers are
investigating for all people with disabilities, they are traveling to
these places and bringing these suits based on their own interests. The
testers have sought to utilize the facilities and have been injured by
the facilities' lack of compliance. This Note will address those who
voluntarily define themselves as testers, as well as those who are
fulfilling the same purpose but refuse to accept the label due to the
negative connotation courts and the media have attached to the term.
B. Standingfor Title XI ADA Lawsuits
Title III of the ADA presents an additional obstacle for testers
seeking standing. Individuals can only seek injunctive relief under

Title

111,92

and courts require supplemental facts to assert standing

for injunctive relief because injunctions regulate future conduct.
Therefore, a plaintiff must present the court with a case that threatens
future injury.9 The Supreme Court addressed this issue in two
94
landmark cases. As noted above, City of Los Angeles v. Lyons
established the rule that "'[jp]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not
in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief
95
..ifunaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects."
The Court found that the plaintiff, who was placed in a chokehold by
arresting officers that caused him to pass out, lacked standing to
seek an injunction against the police practice-"-[lhe emotional
consequences of a prior act simply are not a sufficient basis for an
9' Access Now, Inc., Understanding the Word "Plaintiff', http://www.adaaccessnow.orgl
plaintiff.htmn (last visited Jan. 10, 2008).
-42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (2000).
93 Disability Advocates & Counseling Group, Inc. v. Betancourt, No. 05-CIV-60740COOKIE/BROWN, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38939, at *3 (S.D. Fla. June 7, 2005) (citing
Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11 th Cir. 200 1))
(denying standing sua sponte to plaintiff because he did not allege a chance of future injury
necessary for injunctive relief).
S461 U.S. 95 (1983).
95Id at 102 (alterations in original) (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96
(1974)).
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injunction absent a real and immediate threat of future injury by the
defendant.",96 The Court ruled that despite Lyons' fear that the
brutality could happen again, his allegation of future injury was
speculative and did not warrant injunctive relief because he could not
prove that the police would ever stop him again or that the officers
would choke him.9 The Court, assuming that people would conduct
their activities in a lawful way, found the allegation that the plaintiff
would again commit a crime to establish standing was absurd.9
Essentially, the Court in Lyons was concerned that the future conduct
would never happen again because the plaintiffs claim was based on
third-party conduct, and it refused to accept the plaintiffs assertions
99
concerning his own future conduct.
Lyons was later endorsed by another Supreme Court case, Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildife.' 00 In Lujan environmental groups claimed the
potential for future harm existed because they would not be able to
observe endangered species in foreign countries as a result of projects
that an American agency was funding. The plaintiffs sought
injunctive relief against the funding, and the plaintiffs' members, who
had previously visited the foreign countries, expressed the intent to
return at an unspecified date. However, the Court denied standing,
stating, "Such 'some day' intentions-without any description of
concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some
day will be-do not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent'
injury that our cases require."100' Despite denying standing, the Court
in Lujan affirmed the idea that Congress can grant standing to a
plaintiff pursuant to a statute,10 2 which is important in the context of
standing under the ADA.
As a result of these two Supreme Court cases, the Article III
requirement of "actual or imminent" has become "actual and
imminent." This seemingly inconsistent standard has created a huge
roadblock for Title III tester plaintiffs, because testers harmed by
public accommodation violations are limited to injunctive relief. As a
result of Lyons and Lujan, testers will lack standing if they do not
subject themselves to the harm again or make plans to subject
themselves to the harm again. While this seems odd, courts have
repeatedly relied on the holdings in Lyons and Lujan as a basis for
96 Id

at 107 n.8.

Id. at 108.
Id. at 105-06.
99 Id. at 105-113.
1-504 U.S. 555 (1992).
1011Id. at 564.
97
98

102M. at 578.
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denying standing in Title III cases. One court even stated that "every
court to have considered the standing requirements under Title III of
the ADA has held that in order for a private litigant to prove standing,
she must show a risk of future harm."' 03
C. Case Law ConcerningADA Testers
Testers attempting to assert standing under Title III of the ADA
have met animosity in federal courts throughout the nation. The vast
majority of courts that have dealt with the issue have denied standing
to plaintiffs.'0 District courts have become extremely skeptical of
tester lawsuits, calling them a "'cottage industry' that is driven by
attorneys' fees' 05 and referring to an ADA plaintiff as a "professional
pawn in an ongoing scheme to bilk attorney's fees." 0 6 These
appraisals are grounded in the fact that the ADA allows recovery of
attorney's fees and litigation costs for successful plaintiffs. 0 7
Many courts denying standing have argued that the plaintiffs are
barred from receiving injunctive relief, because, although the
plaintiffs had admittedly been injured in the past, they could not
prove the potential for harm in the future. 0 8 In Bird v. Lewis & Clark
College,109 the plaintiff was in a wheelchair and decided to participate
in an overseas program offered by her college. While overseas, the
plaintiff suffered numerous obstacles that prevented her from
enjoying her experience. She could not get in and out of her dorm
103Blake v. Southcoast Health Sys., Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 126, 132-33 (D. Mass. 2001).

14See Shotz v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2001); Harris v. Stonecrest Care Auto Ctr.,
472 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (S.D. Cal. 2007); Cross v. Boston Mkt. Corp., No. 07cv486J (LSP), 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39407 (S.D. Cal. May 30, 2007); Wilson v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 426 F.
Supp. 2d 1115 (S.D. Cal. 2006); Moss v. Comfort Inn Woodland Hills, No. CV 04-7939 FMC
(Mcx), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81429 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2006), affd, 275 Fed. App'x 717 (9th
Cir. 2008); Molski v. Kahn Winery, 381 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (C.D. Cal. 2005), af'd sub nom.
Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 594
(2008); Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 359 F. Supp. 2d 924 (C.D. Cal. 2005), af'd sub nom.
Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 594
(2008); Rodriguez v. Investco, L.L.C., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (M.D. Fla. 2004); Brother v. Tiger
Partner, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (M.D. Fla. 2004); Moreno v. G & M Oil Co., 88 F. Supp.
2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Naiman v. N.Y. Univ., No. 95 Civ. 6469 (LMM), 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS056616 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 1997).
Carri Becker, Note, Private Enforcement of the Americans with Disabilities Act Via
Serial Litigation: Abusive or Commendable?, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 93, 97, 113-14
(2006) (quoting Rodriquez, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1280-81) (discussing the serial ADA litigation
and suggesting reforms that would allow a safe haven for businesses that make a good faith
effort to comply with the ADA).
1o6Rodriguez, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1285.
10742 U.S.C. § 12205 (2000).
08
See Adam A. Milani, Wheelchair Users Who Lack "Standing": Another Procedural
Threshold Blocking Enforcement of Titles II and Ill of the ADA, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 69,
84 (2004).
'M303 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2002).
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room, could not use the toilet or shower unless someone assisted her,
had to be carried up several stairs to reach the cafeteria, and was
consistently forced to stay at lodging that was not wheelchair
accessible. 1 0 However, even after these events the plaintiff was
denied Title III standing because she had not alleged that she planned
1
to return or participate again in the overseas program.'" '
In Bird the plaintiff did not assert the threat of future injury, but
even when plaintiffs make such an averment, the courts still deny
standing. In Brother v. Tiger Partner, LLC" 2 a wheelchair-ridden
plaintiff visiting his mother with his deaf and blind wife entered a
hotel where the concierge told them there were neither wheelchair
accessible bathrooms nor any services, such as text telephones,
available for the deaf."13 Despite the plaintiff's claims that he visited
the hotel in the past and frequently visited his mother, the court found
that he lacked standing, stating: "Plaintiff here has not sufficiently
established a credible threat of future injury. ...And, in view of his
extensive litigation history, Mr. Brother's professed intent to return to
the property is insufficient."" 4 Brother is not the only case to apply
this rationale; it demonstrates what numerous courts are now
considering to be an important factor in the standing analysis: the
motivation of the plaintiff. The court in Brother cited a great number
of cases in support of the proposition that a plaintiff who brings
numerous cases under Title III of the ADA can and will be denied

standing."1

5

Courts attempt to disguise their animosity towards ADA testers by
commenting that their focus on the plaintiff's litigation history is not
"outcome determinative."" 6 However, the plaintiff's history and
motivation is often the primary, or sole, focus of a court's standing
analysis." 7 For example, in Wilson v. Costco Wholesale Corp."' the
"Old, at 1017-18.
"'1Id at 10 19-20.
112331

F. Supp. 2d 1368 (M.D. Fla. 2004).
11jd. at 1370-71.
4
11 1d at 1374.
115See id. at

1373-75.

116Wilson v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1123 (S.D. Cal. 2006)

(denying standing to a mobility-impaired store patron who encountered several architectural
barriers, even though he had visited the store twice before and visited the area three to four
times per year).
117 See Harris v. Stonecrest Care Auto Ctr., 472 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1216-17 (S.D. Cal.
2007) (giving weight to plaintiff's extensive litigation history because a large number of
previous Title III claims raised credibility issues); D'Lil v. Best W. Encina Lodge & Suites, 415
F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (noting that plaintiffs comments regarding other
pending ADA suits were insufficient to express any return to the relevant geographic area),
rev'd, 538 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2008), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3449 (Feb. 3, 2009)
(No. 08-993); Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 385 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1046-48 (C.D. Cal.
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plaintiff encountered architectural barriers while visiting a Costco
store. The plaintiff demonstrated that he had visited the store before
and traveled to the area a few times a year, but the court held that
these facts did not establish standing and went on to comment that the
plaintiff had filed over eighty lawsuits throughout California. 1 9 The
court heavily relied on the plaintiffs motivation as the reason for
denying standing.
The court in Wilson is not alone; many courts have actually
concluded that a serial plaintiffs extensive litigation history can
undermine his professed intent to return. 12 0 In D'Lii v. Best Western
Encina Lodge & Suites12 1 the parties signed a consent decree, and the
case came to the court to determine attorney's fees. Instead of
concentrating on the appropriate attorney's fees, the court decided to
go into an extensive, sua sponte analysis of standing.122 While the
plaintiff claimed that she wished to return to the hotel because of her
trust in the Ramada brand, the court commented: "[Slhe obviously
knows such a preference would be relevant."123 The district court
ultimately denied standing, but the decision was later reversed, with
the Ninth Circuit Court stating that "we must be particularly cautious
about affirming credibility determinations that rely on a plaintiff's
past ADA litigation."2 However, most courts still follow the
rationale of the district court in D'Lii. In a more recent case, the court
took the same stance concerning credibility, finding the plaintiffs

2005) (explaining why plaintiff's extensive ADA litigation history undercut both his credibility
and alleged intent to return to the defendant restaurant), ajffd sub nomn. Moiski v. Evergreen
Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 594 (2008); Molski v.
Kahn Winery, 381 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (denying supplemental jurisdiction over
plaintiff's ADA claim and citing plaintiff's litigation history as proof of impermissible forum
shopping), affd sub numn. Moiski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 594 (2008); Brother v. CPL Investments, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 1358,
1369 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (denying standing because of plaintiff's extensive litigation history and
failure to stay at the inaccessible hotel).
118 426 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
9
11
1d at 1122-23.
120 Mandarin Touch Rest., 385 F. Supp. 2d at 1046 ("[T~he Court finds that Mr. Molski's
litigation history undercuts his credibility and belies an intent to return to the Mandarin
Touch."); Rodriguez v. Investco, L.L.C., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1279, 1284-85 (M.D. Fla.
2004) (noting that plaintiff had filed nearly two hundred ADA lawsuits and was merely trying to
swindle attorney's fees from defendants).
121415 F. Supp. 2d 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev'd, 538 F.3d 1031 (9th Cit. 2008), petition
for cert.filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3449 (Feb. 3, 2009) (No. 08-993).
122Id.
23

1 ld
24

at 1056.

D'Lil v. Best W. Encina Lodge & Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008), petition
for cert.filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3449 (Feb. 3,2009) (No. 08-993).
1
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testimony unreliable when viewed in conjunction with his litigation
history.'25
Even specific individual plaintiffs are being labeled as vexatious.
Jarek Molski, a self-proclaimed "sheriff 126 and activist for the ADA,
27
felt the wrath of the court in Molski v. Mandarin Touch Restaurant.1
Molski relies on a wheelchair for mobility and sued the defendant for
failure to comply with Title III of the ADA.128 The opinion contains a
section labeled "Statement of Facts," but all the court discussed was
the plaintiffs litigation history. 12 9 The court completely disregarded
the facts of the case. Instead, the sole focus was on the large number
of lawsuits Molski had filed under Title 111.130 The court admitted that
"this complaint appears credible standing alone," but ultimately
concluded that the complaint's "validity is undermined when viewed
alongside Molski's other complaints."' 3 1 The court did not stop at
denying him standing. The court stated, "It is possible, even likely,
that many of the businesses sued were not in full compliance with the
ADA," 32 and added, "[a]fter examining Plaintiffs extensive
collection of lawsuits, the Court believes that most, if not all, were
filed as part of a scheme of systematic extortion, designed to harass
and intimidate business owners into agreeing to cash settlements." 33
In the end, the court labeled Molski a vexatious litigant and required
him to file an order with any new complaint to essentially warn a
judge of his litigious past.134
There are few cases in which the courts have granted standing to
ADA testers. The rationale behind granting standing is that the
plaintiffs are prevented from visiting the facility and suffer an actual
and imminent injury.135 But in those cases that have granted standing,
the court usually refused to dismiss the case for lack of standing
because it will not throw out the case at the early stages of litigation 3 6
125

Harris v. Stonecrest Care Auto Ctr., 472 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1216-17 (S.D. Cal. 2007).
126 Molski v. Arby's Huntington Beach, 359 F. Supp. 2d 938, 942 (C.D. Cal. 2005), af'd
sub nom. Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129
S. Ct. 594 (2008).
127 347 F. Supp. 2d 860 (C.D. Cal. 2004), af'd sub nom. Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty
Corp., 2500 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 594 (2008).
1 8Id at 862.
129Id at 861.

130 Id
13'Id at 864.
32
1 Id at 865.
'3 Id at 864.
34

1

35

Id at 866-67.

Milani, supra note 108, at 93-94.
See Loskot v. Super Star, LLC, No. C 06-7199 CW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45237, at
*7-8 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2007); Bruni v. FMCO, L.L.C., No. 2:06-cv-293-FtM-29SPC, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18641, at *11 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 16, 2007); Cross v. Pac. Coast Plaza Inv., L.P.,
36

1
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or before discovery has occurred.13 7 Other courts have granted
standing to a plaintiff who consistently utilized the services of a chain
or had acquired a taste for a restaurant's food. 138 In addition, courts
have granted standing where defendants blatantly refused to change
policies and caused accessibility problems to continue to exist. 3 9 A
review of the case law reveals only one court that has completely
rejected the arguments proposed for denying injunctive relief to Title
III plaintiffs. In Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena
Corp., 140 the federal district court granted standing to a disabled
attorney and a nonprofit advocacy organization, stating: "The court is
reluctant to embrace a rule of standing that would allow an alleged
wrongdoer to evade the court's jurisdiction so long as he does not
4
injure the same person twice."'1 '
All in all, the case law paints a dreary picture for those attempting
to seek compliance with Title III of the ADA. Courts are generally
suspicious of these plaintiffs and will deny standing based on their
assessments of the credibility of the plaintiffs statements. The largest
obstacle that now confronts ADA testers is the courts' focus on the
testers' motivation for visiting the defendants' facilities.
IV. TILE III OF THE ADA MAY HAVE ONLY ONE LEG TO STAND ON:
TESTER LAWSUITS

A. Supportfor Tester Standing: Legislative Intent of the ADA
The ADA was meant to be a solution to what Congress felt was a
severe problem in America. The House report on the bill stated:
The purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate to end discrimination
against individuals with disabilities and to bring persons with

No. 06 CV 2543 JM (RBB), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16138, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2007); Org.
for the Advancement of Minorities with Disabilities v. Brick Oven Rest., 406 F. Supp. 2d 1120,
1132 (S.D. Cal. 2005); Molski v. Arby's Huntington Beach, 359 F. Supp. 2d 938, 947 n.10
(C.D. Cal. 2005) (allowing standing but warning that "[alt successive stages in the litigation,
however, Mr. Moiski may be required to submit additional evidence to support his standing"),
aff'd sub nom. Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 594 (2008).
13 See, e.g., Access 4 All, Inc. v. Chi. Grande, Inc., No. 06 C 5250, 2007 U.S. Dist LEXIS
35304, at *12-13 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2007).
13 See, e.g., Parryv. L & L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1079-80 (D. Haw. 2000).
139See, e.g., Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2002).
140982 F. Supp. 698 (D. Or. 1997).
141Id at 762.
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disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of
American life; to provide enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals with disabilities, and to
ensure that the Federal government plays a central role in
enforcing these standards on behalf of individuals with
41

disabilities.1

Congress also passed the ADA because it felt that existing federal and
state laws were inadequate to address the problems faced by people
with disabilities.14 3 The House report explained: "'[O]ur society is
still infected by the ancient, now almost subconscious assumption that
people with disabilities are less than frully human and therefore are not
fully eligible for the opportunities, services, and support systems
which are available to other people as a matter of right."""4 Congress
recognized the isolation, suicides, and dependency on welfare
programs that resulted from discrimination against people with
41

disabilities.1

Not only was the ADA as a whole passed as a broadly sweeping
remedy, Title III is specifically meant to be extremely broad.14 6 Title
III covers an unprecedented number of places and providers,
including virtually all commercial public establishments.147 However,
Congress's intent was not only to codify' the rights of people with
disabilities, but also to generate inclusion and end discrimination as
a result of strong enforcement of the statute. Congress emphasized
that there is not enough compliance with state laws and that "the
rights guaranteed by the ADA are meaningless without effective
enforcement provisions." 4
To ensure effective enforcement
Congress provided for individual enforcement14 9 with a private right
of action for "any person who is being subjected to discrimination on
the basis of disability .. . or who has reasonable grounds for believing
that such person is about to be subjected to discrimination in violation
of section 12183 .. .. "5
142HR REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 22-23 (1990).
4

1 3 Id

at 23.

144Id. at 31 (quoting Joint Hearingon H.R. 2273, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct Of
1989: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomms. on Select Educ. and Employment Opportunities of
the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong. 62 (1989) (prepared statement of Dustin Dart,
Jr., Chairman, Task Force on the Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities)).
1'5 Id at 42-43.
146Se Ann Hubbard, The MajorLife Activity of Belonging, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 217,
255 (2004) (discussing how belonging is the heart of the ADA and arguing for judicial
recognition of belonging as a major life activity).
147 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 34-35 (1990).
148Id. at 40.
150 42 U.S.C.

§ 12188(a)(1) (2000).
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Tester standing is imperative in order to ensure that the rights
guaranteed by the ADA do not become meaningless abstractions.
Many people are reluctant to bring lawsuits against businesses for
violations of the ADA or are unaware of what constitutes a violation
under a very cumbersome and technically detailed statute.' 5' Other
victims of ADA violations may not have the incentive or the
resources to bring ADA lawsuits.'152 Thus testers, as private attorneys
general, serve a vital role in redressing the injuries suffered due to
violations of Title III of the ADA. Overall, denying injunctive relief
to individuals who prove they were victims of discrimination, even as
testers, weakens and undercuts congressional intent to deter and
remedy discrimination through utilizationi of private individuals to
enforce the statute. The Supreme Court supported the idea of private
attorneys general in the employment context, stating: "We have
rejected the unclean hands defense 'where a private suit serves
important public purposes. ""153 Analogously, the unclean hands
defense is inapplicable to Title III testers who serve the important
public purpose fighting for access for the disabled population.
Some experts have argued that the litigiousness of testers is a
result of the private enforcement provision of the ADA. Numerous
courts have denied standing to plaintiffs based on their litigious past,
but, arguably, these plaintiffs are merely taking advantage of the
congressionally created private enforcement structure. This raises the
question, "why should they be punished for utilizing the statute?" The
numerous cases that are filed are generally commenced by individuals
enforcing their statutory rights in a way Congress intended. Further,
"'.litigation rates are no measure of abusive litigation,""154 especially
when it seems the violations of Title III are so numerous. In addition,
it should be noted that suits against businesses comprise the largest
category of civil cases overall.'
Courts are not allowed to overlook congressional intent when
determining standing,' 56 but that is exactly what courts are doing
when they deny standing to ADA testers. As long as the plaintiffs are
151Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 763 (D. Or. 1997) ("Plaintiffs
also have the incentive and resources to prosecute an action such as this, which often is not the
case with an individual suite guest, especially one from out-of-town who may have no plans to
ever return to Portland.").
152Id

53
1 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 360 (1995) (quoting Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968)).
154
B3agenstos, supra note 6, at 21 n.86 (quoting Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation
and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447,
457(2004)).

155Id.
156Havens

Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982).
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fulfilling the constitutional requirements for standing, the courts
should not create additional standing requirements contrary to
congressional intent. ADA expert Ruth Colker stated: "Congress
clearly concluded that injunctive relief was necessary to remedy the
evils that it made unlawful through the passage of ADA Title Ill. It is
wrong to use Article Ill's standing requirements to undermine
57
Congress' purpose in enacting the ADA."'
B. Supportfor Tester Standing: CongressionalCreation of Broad
Standing Rights Under the ADA
Tester standing is also appropriate under the broad rights Congress
created in the ADA. The Supreme Court has established that
"Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of
which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without
the statute."'
When there are statutorily created standing rights
"courts accordingly lack the authority to create prudential barriers
to standing." 59 Congress therefore may create statutory rights
that expand the definition of what constitutes an injury and override
the judicially created prudential limitations on standing,' 60 but "'it
may not eliminate the constitutional "case or controversy"
requirement."' 16'1 The creation of a statutory right persuaded the
Supreme Court in Havens Realty to allow tester standing,16 2 because
63
"Congress had conferred a sort of legal interest on testers."
On its face, Title Ill of the ADA allows a court to award
an injunction to "any person who is being subjected to
discrimination."' 64 This constitutes a broad grant of statutory
standing,16 5 comparable to the FHA, that should only require ADA
plaintiffs to fulfill the constitutional elements of standing and not be
57

Colkcer, supra note 10, at 399.
R. S. v. Richard D., 4 10 U.S. 614, 617 n. 3 (1973) (discussing the constitutional
requirements for standing).
159Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 372 (citing Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441
U.S. 91, 103 n.9, 109 (1979)).
160Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc. v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268,
1278 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 372) (denying standing to the
individual testers under Title VII, but granting standing to the organization to seek injunctive
relief to the extent the effects impaired its programs).
161Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1078 (D. Haw. 2000) (quoting
Hoepfl v. Barlow, 906 F. Supp. 317, 323 (E.D. Va. 1995)).
162Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 373.
63
1 Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and
Article 11, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 190 (1992) (arguing that the decision in Lujan came out the
wrong way because the Court ignored the congressional grant of standing, which was
dispositive).
1

158Linda

142 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (2000).
65
1

Markey, supra note 5, at 208.
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faced with judicially created hurdles such as the focus on the
motivation of the plaintiff.166 As standing expert Cass R. Sunstein
argues in highlighting the downfalls of Lujan, Congress's grant of
67
standing "create[s] the relevant injury for Article III purposes."'1
Thus ADA plaintiffs should not be required to meet prudential
requirements. The courts that have created other barriers to standing
that go beyond proving the propensity of the injunctive relief, such as
looking at the plaintiffs motivation or past litigation history to deny
standing, are in opposition to the congressional conferral of broad
standing rights to individuals harmed under Title 111.
Congress' addition of the "futility doctrine" to the ADA is another
Ifactor supporting standing for testers. 16 8 The doctrine states that
"nothing . . . shall require a person with a disability to engage in a
futile gesture if such person has actual notice that a person or
organization covered by this subchapter does not intend to comply
with its provisions." 16 9 The doctrine permits a plaintiff to sue if he or
she actually would visit the inaccessible facility if the barriers were
removed.170 Representative Steny Hoyer provided the House with a
description of the futile gesture language before the ADA was passed:
"[A] person does not have to engage in a 'futile gesture' if the
person has notice that an entity covered under [T]itle III does
not intend to comply with its provisions. For example, if a
theatre has turned away six people with cerebral palsy .. a
person with cerebral palsy can bring suit without first
subjecting himself or herself to the humiliation of being
7
turned away by the theatre."'1 1

One court addressing the futility doctrine stated:

66

See Havens Realty, 45 5 U. S. at 3 72 (citing Gladstone Realtors v.
U.S. 91, 103 n.9, 109 (1979)).
167Sunstein, supra note 163, at 223.
16642 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1).
1

Vill. of Bellwood, 441

169Id

170Access 4 All, Inc. v. Chi. Grande, Inc., No. 06 C 5250, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35304,
at *2[1-22 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2007) (granting standing to the tester and the organization that
employed him for a Title Ill suit).
171Milani, supra note 108, at 128 (quoting Sharp v. Waterfront Rests., No. 99-CV-200 TW
(AJB), 1999 WL 1095486, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 1999) (quoting 136 CONG. REC. E1913-01,
E1920 (daily ed. May 22, 1990))) (analyzing the proposed ADA Notification Act that would
require plaintiffs to give notice to, allegedly inaccessible businesses ninety days before filing a
lawsuit and determining it to be unnecessary because the Congress meant for Title III to
incorporate all of the Civil Rights Act Title 11's remedies, which would include a thirty day
notice requirement to defendants before filing a suit).
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If the 'futile gesture' language of Title III is to mean
anything, it means that those in [plaintiffs] position may sue
to bring into compliance with the ADA places of public
accommodation that they know are non-complaint [sic],
without having to allege an intention to return to such places
before their lawsuits can have the effect of forcing
compliance. 172
Recognizing this argument, the Ninth Circuit in Pickern v. Holiday
Quality Foods Inc. 173 held that, based on the futility doctrine,
injury continues if a plaintiff learns of the inaccessibility of a
public accommodation and, therefore, is deterred from visiting the
defendant's facility.174 As long as a plaintiff is deterred from visiting
the facility, the injury continues for standing purposes. 175 Courts that
have refused to believe the plaintiffs assertions that he or she will
return are not only wrong in questioning the plaintiffs assertions and
motivations, but also in placing an unnecessary barrier for standing on
the plaintiff in light of the futility doctrine.
C Supportfor Tester Standing:~Underenforcement of the ADA
Standing should also be granted because the ADA is severely
underenforced. Tester standing is one way to ensure this important
remedial statute does not become a symbolic gesture by Congress
rather than the solution Congress intended. There is a strong accord
among experts and other commentators that Title III of the ADA
is underenforced,176 providing limited effectiveness in light of
continuing setbacks.177 Overall, the goal of Congress-to grant people
172Clark

v. McDonald's Corp., 213 F.R.D. 198, 229 (D.N.J. 2003).
293 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2002).
1 1d at 1136-37.
1751d. at 1137.
176 See Katherine R. Annas, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams.
Part of an Emerging Trend of Supreme Court Cases Narrowing the Scope of the ADA, 81 N.C.
L. REv. 835 (2003) (arguing that the ADA has not made the changes that were intended and
court decisions continue to narrow the scope of the statute, which exacerbates the problem of
underenforcement); Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 4 (discussing the need for private enforcement
in Title III of the ADA and the fact that the courts are causing the abusive litigation); Colker,
supra note 10 (discussing how Title III has been unsuccessful in remedying the lack of
acconmmodation for people with disabilities in public places); Hymas & Parkinson, supra note 3,
at 352-53 (noting that many facilities have not conformed with the requirements of the ADA);
Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58
VAND. L. REv. 1807, 1832-34 (2005) (supplying survey data relating to people with disabilities
and areas covered by Title 111).
'" See, e.g., Michael W. Kelly, Note, Weakening Title III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act: The Buckhannon Decision and Other Developments Limiting Private
Enforcement, 10 ELDER L.J. 361 (2002) (discussing court decisions that have limited the impact
of Title 111,for example narrowing the definition of prevailing party for those who can receive
17
74
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with disabilities access to all aspects of society-is far from being

realized.178

Studies have demonstrated that the ADA has not created the
equality of access that Congress intended. The National Organization
on Disability/Harris Poll survey concluded that people with
disabilities lag behind those without disabilities on most of the quality
of life factors that Title III addresses, 179 with significant disparities in
areas such as socializing, eating out, transportation, and health care.18
At congressional hearings for a proposed ADA amendment,
numerous advocates discussed how the majority of businesses across
the country remain inaccessible, even in cases where accommodation
would be easy and inexpensive. 18' In her article titled The ADA 's
Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights Paradigm,
Bonnie Poitras Tucker, a professor of law who suffers from a hearing
disability, expressed frustration that many hotels she has visited are
still not compliant with the ADA.'18 2 Her story is just one example of
the burdens people are forced to deal with despite the presence of the
ADA. It has been estimated that less than 2 percent of public
buildings in the United States fully comply with Title 111.183 Even
more disturbing, businesses are not making necessary changes even
where barriers are easily removable.184 "[Eighteen] years after
enactment of [the ADA] a reasonable Utopia has not yet been
created," because business owners still refuse to spend money to
18
expend the efforts necessary to benefit the disabled. 1
Even the cases brought to enforce Title III are not resulting in
accessibility. In 2005, Professor Michael Waterstone concluded that
80 percent of all Title III cases brought resulted in a pro-defendant
ruling.18 6 Waterstone argued that these extremely pro-defendant
outcomes demonstrate that there is underenforcement of Title 111, not

attorney's
fees and the denial of architect liability).
178
Milani, supra note 108, at 109.
17 9 Waterstone, supranote 176, at 1832.
18Id. at 1832-33 (stating that, for example, there is a 10 percent gap in the high school
graduation rate between people with disabilities and people without disabilities).
18,See ADA Notification Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 49-50 (2000) (statement of Rick A. Schotz, ADA
Consulting Associates, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.).
182Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The ADA's Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights
Paradigm,62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 382-83 (2001) (discussing the problems with drafting the ADA
as a civil rights statute).
183
Becker, supra note 105, at 99.
184Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 4.
185
Tucker, supra note 182, at 337.
186
Waterstone, supra note 176, at 1830 (reviewing thirteen years of appellate cases from
1991-2004).
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that plaintiffs are just unwilling to bring the cases. 17Another study
by Professor Ruth Colker found a small number of cases were filed
under Title 111, only twenty-five appellate cases in six years between
1992 and 1998, with Title III lawsuits making up only 5 percent of all
the cases filed under the ADA. 188 Of the small number of appellate
cases, defendants won 72 percent of the cases through summary

189
judgment or dismissal.

Title III's limited effectiveness and underenforcement is often
attributed to the continual setbacks to a plaintiffs ability to sue for a
violation. 90 "[M]any courts have not been receptive to the principles
upon which the ADA is premised and have not helped to foster
promotion of those principles."' 9 1 The ADA has been called a free
92
ride, encountering judicial and public backlash since its inception,
and in the context of Title III this backlash has resulted in
underenforcement. Experts have noted trial judges' strong tendency to
grant motions for summary judgment in favor of defendants.19 3 As
noted above, judges are ruling for defendants even though, in a
significant number of cases, the defendants were violating the statute
and therefore injuring the plaintiffs that were before the court.' 94 The
courts seem to be ignoring the purpose of the statute and instead
substituting their own ideas of what is fair.' 9 5 People with disabilities
are dealt a serious setback when their lawsuits are dismissed for
lack of standing. Standing for testers is crucial to remedy the
underenforcement of the statute, because "[ilf the ADA's public
accommodations title is to be enforced to any significant extent under
current law, serial litigation is probably essential."196 Therefore, the
statute's effect depends almost entirely on private enforcement, and

1871d. at 1854.
1
88Coflker, supra note 10, at 400.
189Id
19 Id. at 401 ("The verdict data confirms that plaintiffs are unlikely to sue under ADA
Title III.").
191
Tucker, supra note 182, at 383.
192Kelly, supra note 177, at 369-70 (citing Cary LaCheen, Achy Breaky Pelvis, Lumber
Lung and Juggler's Despair: The Portrayalof the Americans with DisabilitiesAct on Television
and Radio, 21 BERKELEY J.EMI'. & LAB. L. 223, 227-31 (2000)).
193Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 99, 101 (1999) (discussing the antagonistic and skeptical views judges
have displayed towards ADA cases, and the negative decisions that plaintiffs have faced at
bench trials).
94 Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 5 (noting that in the case of serial ADA plaintiffs, judges
tend to think the practices of such plaintiffs and their counsel are abusing the system).
"95Tucker, supra note 182, at 340 (noting that the ADA's language can send conflicting
messages and judges tend to interpret the act through their own sense of fairness).
196Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 6-7.
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private enforcement, in turn, depends on allowing tester standing in
cases that meet the necessary constitutional requirements.
Further adding to the underenforcement problem, and contrary
to the predictions of Congress, state law is not adequately
supplementing the ADA. 197 While many states have supplemental
statutes, in 2005 only twenty-one of those states provide for
compensatory damages in the event of a violation,198 and only five
states had anti-discrimination statutes that were certified by the
Department of Justice.' 99 Even those states with significant devotion
to elimination of discrimination based on disability have not passed
legislation for more expansive relief than that available under Title
1.20Many pcople hoped state law would fill the remedial gap left
open by Title 111. However, plaintiffs currently have no refuge in state
law claims. Because, in the end, the majority of states do not provide
for compensatory damages and cases in federal court are frequently
dismissed for lack of standing, businesses do not have sufficient

incentives to comply with Title

111.20 1

Businesses are apparently

willing to take the limited risk that a plaintiff will succeed in winning
injunctive relief rather than voluntarily complying with the statute.
The result is, once again, severe underenforcement of Title 111.
In addition, there is reason to believe that the Attorney General
is not bringing these cases at an appropriate rate. A report by
the National Council on Disability discovered that the Department of
Justice's Disability Section is understaffed, resulting in .. significant
operational consequences."' 202 Overall, the public enforcement
system cannot handle the responsibility placed on it under the
ADA. 0 As a result, the enforcement of Title III against businesses
that are not in the public eye almost completely rests on private
individuals . 2 04 The Department of Justice, the agency charged with
national enforcement, rarely relies on litigation to enforce the ADA,
focusing instead on settlement agreements; 205 further, on average,
supra note 10, at 405.
1 Waterstone, supra note 176, at 1870.
1991d. at 1858-59.
200Colker, supra note 10, at 405.
201Id at 411 (noting that it may be cheaper for a business to deal with a single plaintiff
years down the road rather than having to incur the expenses of compliance from the
beginning).
202
Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 9 (quoting NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, PROMISES TO
KEEP: A DECADE OF FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN'S WITH DISABILITIES ACT 38
(2000)).
20 3 Waterstone, supranote 176, at i1873.
2
04Kelly, supra note 177, at 362 (citing Paul V. Sullivan, Note, The Americans with
DisabilitiesAct of 1990: An Analysis of Title 111 and Applicable Case Law, 29 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 20
1117,
1141-42 (1995)).
5
waterstone, supra note 176, at 1873.
197Cotker,
98
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only one settlement agreement per month is brought. 0 The
Department's principle concentration is also on the future, removing
barriers over time rather than now.2 0 Given the enormity of the task
placed on the Attorney General, private suits by necessity represent
the main tool for ensuring compliance with Congress's intent in
passing the ADA.2 0
D. Supportfor Tester Standing: The History of Tester Standing in
Other Civil Rights Contexts
The consistent (though sometimes qualified) acceptance of tester
standing under the FHA and Title VII supports the argument that
courts should grant expansive standing rights under the ADA.
Numerous analogies are appropriately drawn betwecn the ADA, the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the FHA. The ADA expressly
incorporates the remedies under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,20 and Title III specifically incorporates enforcement provisions
in private actions comparable to the provisions in the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.210 As with the ADA, complaints by private persons are the
primary method of obtaining compliance with the FHA despite the
statute's grant of authority to the Attorney General to bring
lawsuits.2 1 In addition to the comparable language in the statutes, the
ADA, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the FHA are all broad,
sweeping civil rights statutes with purposes and structures that are
functionally identical.
The Supreme Court has established that the standing doctrine
should be liberally applied in civil rights cases.21 In Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. 213 the Court concluded that where
private enforcement suits "are the primary method of obtaining
compliance with the Act" and where Congress defined discrimination
broadly, Article III standing should be construed as widely as
possible.2 1 The broad standing doctrine used in these civil rights
contexts has been applied where both damages and injunctive relief

206

Colker, supra note 10, at 404.

207Kelly, supra note 177, at 366.
208Id. at 3 67; see also Bagenstos, supra note
2

09H.R.

210

6, at 10.
REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 126 (1990).

Id.

supra note 49, at 1237 (quoting Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S.
205, 209
(1972)).
212
See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982); Trafficante, 409 U.S.
at 209.
213409 U.S. 205 (1972).
214MIdat 209.
21'Haydon,
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are sought. 1 A tester plaintiff who prevails under Title VII or the
FHA can receive injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive
damages, attorney's fees, and other equitable relief 216 The rationale
for allowing broad standing in these contexts is therefore not limited
to one form of relief over the other. This is an important point,
considering the limited remedies available under Title III. Consistent
with the Supreme Court's approval of a liberal standing doctrine, as a
civil rights statute the ADA should enjoy at least the same standard
for standing in injunctive relief cases granted to the FHA and Title
VII.
The ADA's underenforcement, pro-defendant record, and narrow
interpretation of standing are not due to its unique features. 1 in fact,
the ADA has been hailed as the broadest of the civil rights statutes,
going beyond the protections afforded to women and minorities under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.21 Yet courts continue to interpret
standing narrowly under the ADA, which is completely inconsistent
with the standard set by other decisions concerning standing,
including the clear Supreme Court precedent in Havens Really that
granted standing for injunctive relief to testers . 21 9 As a result, the
history of tester standing in the context of the FHA and Title VII
clearly supports standing for testers under the ADA.
Cases brought in the civil rights context demonstrate that the
plaintiffs motivation is not sufficient grounds to deny standing. I
Evers v. Dwyer220 the plaintiff boarded a bus solely for the purpose of
instituting litigation for racial segregation in violation of a state
statute, and he only rode the bus that one time. Although the lower
court decided the plaintiff did not present a case or controversy, the
Supreme Court granted declaratory relief, arguing that the fact that
the tester acted for the purpose of investigating litigation was not
significant.2 2 In another case, the Court was presented with a
provision of the FHA that gave all persons a right to "truthful
215See, e.g., Havens Realty, 455 U.S. 363.
216Steven G. Anderson, Comment, Tester Standing

Under Title VIIP A Rose by Any Other
Name, 41 DEPAuL L. REv. 1217, 1225 (1992) (arguing for tester standing under Title V11 due to
judicial
precedent, executive grants of standing, and separation of powers issues).
217
See Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 242-43 (2001) (reviewing appellate court decisions in ADA employment
discrimination cases and concluding that ADA outcomes are far more pro-defendant than other
civil rights statutes).
218Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination," Accommodation, and the Politics of
(Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REv. 825, 906 (2003) (analogizing rationales for
accommodation
statutes with antidiscrimination statutes).
219

See Havens Realty, 455 U.S. 363.

220 358 U.S. 202 (1958).
221Id. at

204.
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information about available housing. 2 The Court decided that the
tester's intent regarding purchasing the home was irrelevant and did
not change the fact there was an injury when the statute was
violated. 2 Based on these precedents, courts that focus on plaintiffs'
motivations in ADA tester cases are wrong in both discounting and
dismissing the plaintiffs' injuries based upon their intentions for
initiating the litigation. Courts also wrongly discount plaintiffs'
intentions to return to the defendants' facilities, because no precedent
says that a plaintiffs intent to return cannot be motivated in some

way to advance his/her

lawsuit. 224

In the end, the focus of the court

should be on the discriminatory action of the defendant that harmed
and continues to harm the plaintiff, not the subjective motivation of
the plaintiff. Motivation does not negate the injury.
E. Supportfor Tester Standing: UnreasonableApplication of Lyons
and Lujan
Courts are mistaken in applying Lyons and Lujan to prevent
standing to ADA testers. While the law of these two cases should not
be abandoned, the Court's rationale for denying standing in the cases
is inapplicable to ADA testers. First, the facts of Lyons and Lujan are
clearly distinguishable from any ADA tester case. The Supreme Court
in Lyons denied standing for injunctive relief at least in part because
the plaintiff could not control whether he would suffer future
injury.225 This concern is not present for testers under Title III of the
ADA, who are not arguing cases where the only way future harm can
occur is dependent upon extreme speculation or the plaintiffs
contention that he will again commit a crime 2 2 6-the suit is in court
because the defendant refuses to make the necessary changes, so there
is little doubt a plaintiff would be subjected to the harm if he or she
were to return. Public accommodations testers can plausibly claim
that they will return to the place of violation, 2 which is different
from claiming that police will choke you or that you plan on traveling
to a faraway country to see exotic animals in the near future. In fact,

U.S. at 373 (discussing the Congress's intention in passing 42
3604(d), 3612(a)).
223Id. at 373-75.
224
Molski v. Price, 224 F.R.D. 479, 483 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (granting standing to a plaintiff
that had a dual motivation for visiting the defendant's facilities).
225Fair Employment Council of Greater Was, Inlc. v'. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268,
1274 226
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
Colker, supra note 10, at 397.
227
Haydon, supra note 49, at 124 1.
222Havens Realty, 455

U.S.C.

§§
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testers have the sole ability to "put themselves in the position of
having to face unlawful conduct in the future. 2
Additionally, a tester's assertions that he or she plans to return to a
public acconmmodation are quite likely true, because the tester would
probably be the first person to make sure the changes were made for
compliance. In one case, the court granted standing to a tester because
the tester had visited the defendant's facility before; the court found it
dispositive that the tester would most likely visit the place again both
to avail himself of the services and to assure that the facility was in
compliance with the ADA. 2 One court noted: "The fact that
Plaintiffs have been and/or are currently involved in other ADA
lawsuits does not Itself automatically render their professed intent to
return to [the defendant's establishment] disingenuous. 3
The Court in Lyons was persuaded to deny standing for injunctive
relief because the plaintiff was able to receive monetary damages. 231
The Court stated, "withholding injunctive relief does not mean that
the 'federal law will exercise no deterrent effect in these
circumstances."' 2 32 Unfortunately, when courts deny standing for
injunctive relief to plaintiffs harmed under the ADA, the result is the
absence of a deterrent effect. Title III only provides for injunctive
relief,2 33

and an individual's other form of relief, attorney's fees, is

reliant on the success of the injunctive relief claim. 234 The result in
Lyons may have been very different if the plaintiff in the case was
faced with the grim reality facing plaintiffs under Title III: no leg to
stand on in court and a defendant who is in violation of a federal
statute but walks away scot-free.
The facts of Lujan are also clearly distinguishable from an ADA
tester case. In Lujan the plaintiffs were environmental groups who
sought associational standing for a claim that challenged regulations
enforced by the executive branch. 3 Their claims created separation
of powers issues, which the Court felt would usurp executive
authority. 3 In clear contrast, claims brought by ADA testers do not
raise a separation of powers concern. 237 The Lujan Court imposed
228Colker, supra note 10, at 3 98.
229Disabled Patriots of Am., Inc. v. Port Hospitality, LLC, No. I :06CV2889, 2007 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS
83035 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 8, 2007).
2 30
Norkunas v. Wynn Resorts Holdings, LLC, No. 2:07-cv-00096-RLH-PAL, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 77355, at *11-12 (D. Nev. Oct. 9, 2007).
231City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111-12 (1983).
232
M. at 112-13 (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974)).
233 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (2000).
2

34See id.

2 35

236

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).

1d at 577.
supra note 59, at 958 ("The absence of important federalism concerns in

237Tardiff,
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stringent requirements on standing for injunctive relief because
judicial restraint is necessary when courts are asked to enjoin the
conduct of the Secretary of the Interior. 3 ADA testers are not
seeking to enjoin federal actors or the legislature; they are seeking
injunctive relief against businesses run by private citizens. It would be
hard to argue that the same jurisprudential concerns in Lujan are
present when one citizen seeks to enforce a federal statute against
another citizen.
On a supplemental note, the facts of Lujan are further
distinguishable because the Lujan plaintiffs did not allege any time at
which they would return, only that they intended to return sometime
in the future.2 3 In many cases where courts have denied standing to
ADA testers, the plaintiffs went beyond a vague future intention to
return and expressed exactly when and why they would return. 4
Testers are not making someday assertions, but rather are usually
arguing they will return to the facility as soon as it is made
accessible 2 4 -and the majority opinion in Lujan did not require
specific dates.2 4 Furthermore, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 4

employment tester cases eliminates the need for such strict standards because the courts are not
being asked to supervise a local or state governmental agency." (citing Jonathan Levy,
Comment, In Response to Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. BMC
Marketing Corp.: Employment Testers Do Have a Leg to Stand On, 80 MiNN. L. REV. 123, 160
(1995))).
238
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577.
239Id. at 5 64.
2
40See D'Lil v. Best W. Encina Lodge & Suites, 538 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding
standing when plaintiff said she would visit the hotel again because she frequented the area and
she trusted the hotel brand); Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1135-39
(9th Cir. 2000) (finiding standing when plaintiff said he would visit the grocery store regularly
because it was near his grandmother's home, where he visited weekly); Access 4 All, Inc. v.
Chi. Grande, Inc., No. 06-C-5250, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35304, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 10, 2007)
(finding standing when plaintiff said he would return to use the services of the hotel, he actually
made a reservation to return, and wished to return to check the compliance of the facility); Moss
v. Comfort Inn Woodlands Hills, No. CV 04-7939 FMC (Mcx), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81429,
at *6-7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2006) (denying standing when plaintiff would be visiting the city
where the defendant's hotel was located and would need a room there because she was in a
serious relationship with someone in the city and therefore planned to stay there every other
month for two to three days), affid, 275 Fed. App'x 717 (9th Cir. 2008); Wilson v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1122 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (denying standing when plaintiff
stated he will continue to visit the store to check compliance and has done so twice since the suit
was filed); Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn Rest., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1077-83 (D. Haw. 2000)
(finiding standing when plaintiff traveled to the restaurant franchise several times a year to order
the restaurant's local dish).
241See generally Milani, supra note 108, at 115 (noting that one of the purposes of the
ADA 242
was to make facilities readily accessible).
Lujan. 504 U.S. at 565 n.2 ( ...[I]mlminence' is concededly a somewhat elastic concept
1)
...
243515 U.S. 200 (1995) (dealing with an equal protection issue but ruling the plaintiff
established standing for injunctive relief because his work would contain subcontractor
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suggests that the exact date for future conduct is not required for a

plaintiff to receive standing for injunctive

relief.244

The plaintiffs in

Adarand did not provide a specific date, and the Supreme Court held
that future conduct that happened annually would be sufficient to

support standing to sue for injunctive

relief

245

In addition, the

requirement of exact dates for return does not take into account the
fact that these plaintiffs may not wish to return to a place that they
know is inaccessible until after changes for compliance are made.
Further, the testers are often suing establishments such as fast food
restaurants and gas stations, and it is impractical to expect an
individual to plan when he/she will next stop at a fast food restaurant
or a gas station.
Even if Lyons and Lujan are applicable to ADA tester cases, the
courts are coming to the wrong conclusion in denying standing.
Courts addressing standing for ADA testers act as if there is a clear
formula set out by Lyons and Lujan that the ADA plaintiffs are not
fulfilling. However, those cases established no clear standard, gave no
degree of likelihood, no specific number of times the plaintiff must

visit the facility, 246 and never suggested that a plaintiffs litigation
history was relevant to standing. Courts that use Lyons and Lujan as
grounds to deny standing are interpreting the cases to stand for
principles those decisions do not endorse and are applying the cases
far too stringently. 4
Additionally, the Supreme Court's rationale for denying standing
for injunctive relief in Lujan and Lyons was that the plaintiff was not
experiencing "continuing, present adverse effects. 4 However, a
plaintiff harmed by a violation of the ADA can allege such present
adverse effects because "a plaintiff who is threatened with harm in the
future because of existing or imminently threatened non-compliance
with the ADA suffers 'imminent injury."' 249 An ADA tester suffers
from an injury that is both actual and imminent when he is currently

compensation clause at least once a year, which the plaintiff claimed was discriminatory and
sought injunctive relief to prevent the clause from being present in construction contracts).
2

44See id
4

at 211-12.

2 5Id.
2

46D'Lil v. Best W. Encina Lodge & Suites, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1052-53 (C.D. Cal.
2006) (arguing that there was no clear standard set out by the Supreme Court decisions, thus
creating its own standard and denying standing to litigious plaintiff), rev'd, 538 F.3d 1031 (9th
(2ir. 2008) (finding standing).
247

See Colker, supra note 10, at 396.

248Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 (1992) (internal quotation marks

omnitted) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)).
24 9
Pickemv. Holiday Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2002).
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deterred from patronizing the defendant's facility.'" 0 In fact, the injury
continues until the defendant makes the necessary changes for
compliance with Title 111,251 and "such discouragement constitutes an
actual and existing injury from which any perceived absence of
252
imminent future harm cannot detract.
The intent behind the ADA was to grant individuals with
disabilities accessibility to all aspects of life and to prevent the
seclusion that has haunted the disabled. Continuous violations of Title
III perpetuate the situation the ADA was meant to remedy: the
plaintiffs are deterred from using the facilities because they are aware
of the problems with accessibility. Further, in the context of the ADA,
when a plaintiff says that he does not wish to return to the defendant's
facility it is usually because he does not wish to be subjected to the
harm again. How does it make sense for a court to deny standing just
because a plaintiff has no specific intention to return, but only
because he is being prevented from using the facility? Many plaintiffs
that have experienced discrimination are so hurt and upset they do not
want to travel to these places for a second dose of shame, humiliation,
and discrimination. 5
F. Supportfor Tester Standing:ADA Testers are PatronsAs Well
ADA testers are different from testers used in other civil rights
contexts because they have multiple reasons for entering a facility. An
ADA tester wishes both to use the facility, as well as test the facility
for compliance. 5 The ADA tester suffers injury both as an individual
with a disability and a private attorney general seeking enforcement

of Title

111.25'

This dual intention strengthens an ADA tester's

argument for standing. In fact, this significant difference eliminates
one of the major criticisms of tester standing: the fact that the testers
25 0
Norkunas v. Wynn Resorts Holdings, LLC, No. 2.07-cv-00096-RLH-PAL, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 77355 (D. Nev. Oct. 9, 2007) (denying standing because plaintiffs presented no
facts showing an intent to return to the defendant's establishment).
251Disabled Patriots of Am., Inc. v. Port Hospitality, LLC, No. 1:06CV2889, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 83035 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 8, 2007) (granting standing to tester plaintiff and the
organization he represented).
252Clark v. McDonald's Corp., 213 F.R.D. 198, 229 (D.N.J. 2003).
253See, e.g., Curtis D. Edmonds, Won 't You Let Me Take You on a Sea Cruise: The
Americans with DisabilitiesAct and Cruise Ships, 28 TUL. MAR. L.J. 271, 275-76 (2004).
254See, e.g., Molski v. Price, 224 F.R.D. 479, 483-84 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (granting standing
to a tester who had a dual motivation for both visiting and returning to the defendant's
restaurant); Clark, 213 F.R.D. at 227-28 (granting standing to the individual plaintiff because he
visited the restaurant with the dual purpose of testing and dining).
255
See Bruni v. Fine Furniture by Gordon's, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-456-FtM-29DNF, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 120, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 3., 2007) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss and
granting standing to an ADA tester who is in a wheelchair and confronted barriers to access at
the defendant's place of business).
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are manipulating the defendants. Employers and housing agents
contend that FHA and Title VII testers did not intend to accept
housing or employment in the first place.2 5 Some defendants have
gone so far as to argue that these testers are committing
misrepresentation and entrapment. 5 At times Title VII testers will
258
make up credentials for their interviews, creating issues of fraud
and forcing employers to spend valuable time and money on
interviewing and evaluating people who have no interest whatsoever
in the position. 5 Unlike FHA and Title VII testers who did not wish
to get the home or the job, ADA testers are denied the opportunity to
access a place that they wish to visit. They are denied the choice that
people without disabilities have, the choice to drive down the street
and stop at whatever restaurant you may want to eat at or whatever
gas station has the cheapest gas. This right to choose is what the ADA
is about.26 Since the ADA testers wish to frequent these facilities,
they are patrons as well as investigators. This fact eliminates one of
the main arguments against tester standing and furthers the argument
for granting standing to ADA testers.
G. Supportfor Tester Standing: It Does Not Mean a Gloomy Future
for Business Owners
Opponents of ADA testers have consistently pointed to the
pressures the statute places on small business owners and have
reprimanded attorneys for taking advantage of these business owners.
These opponents allege that many businesses lack knowledge of their
non-compliance. 26 ' While this may seem like a valid argument,
owners of public accommodations have been given eighteen years to
comply with Title III. Congress specifically considered the interests
of small business owners when drafting the ADA.2 6 It provided
assistance to small businesses by delaying the date of effect for new
construction and offering tax breaks to those who spent time and
money to comply with the ADA. Further, the ADA continues to
provide incentives to businesses in addition to the limited available
256Alex Young K. Oh, Note, Using Employment Testers to Detect Discrimination: An
Ethical and Legal Analysis, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 473,475 (1993) (discussing the practice of
using testers in the employment discrimination context and the ethical issues this practice
presents).
257Id. at 482, 498.
258

Id. at 482.

239Shannon

E. Brown, Note, Tester Standing Under Title VII, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1117, 260
1140 (1992).
Colker, supra note 10, at 398.
261Milani, supra note 108, at 138.
262Id. at 114.
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remedies. 6 Further, because Congress was concerned with the
onerous burden that could be placed on small buinsss
the
"readily achievable 265 language of the statute limits the expenses
required under the statute. The term "readily achievable" means
"easily accomplishable and able to be carried out without much
difficulty or expense. 6 The statute directs courts to consider factors
such as cost, financial resources of the entity, and the impact of the
accommodation on the facility. 26 7 This language provides businesses
with the opportunity to attempt to comply without excessive
expense. 6
9
The statute and its requirements are also widely known.26
Disability advocates argue that "noncompliant business owners and
operators simply choose not to comply, and then become angry when
they are 'caught."' 270 While the statute has received much public
attention and explanation, its requirements are still multifarious. In
response to the complicated nature of compliance with the ADA the
federal government offers numerous free assistance resources to help
businesses fulfill the requirements of Title 111.271
Arguments centering on protection of business owners are
overlooking the purpose of the statute: allowing all people access to
all aspects of life. Congress made an important decision that balanced
the interests of business owners and the interests of protected
individuals. This decision allows private enforcement of Title III. The
burdens on business owners were necessary in order to provide equal
access to people with disabilities. 7 Congress believed that the ADA
required a private enforcement mechanism to serve as the driving
force for compliance. 7 After many years, this private enforcement
mechanism has been stifled, resulting in underenforcement of the
263

See Kelly, supra note 177, at 375-76 ("Congress made clear when it passed the ADA
its desire to protect small businesses from too much legal liability for architectural barriers and
discriminatory practices that barred individuals from access to services.").
2
64Id at 365 (citing Coilker, supra note 10, at 384).
265 42 U. S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)-v) (2000).
261d.
267
1d.
268

§ 12181(9).
§ 12181(9)(A)-(D).

Milani, supra note 108, at 114 (citing President George Bush, Statement upon signing
S. 933,2 6 July 26, 1990, in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601-02).
Bagernstos, supra note 6, at 18.
270
Tammy L. McCabe, Comment, California Disability Anti-Discrimination Law:
Lighthouse in the Storn, or Hunt for Buried Treasure, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 661, 681 (2005)
(citing Mike Hoyem, ADA Cases Catch Defendants by Surprise, NEWS-PRESS (Fort Myers),
Sept. 15, 2003, at 6A) (arguing that the damage remedies provided under California state law
aid in the enforcement of Title III).
271Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 18-19.
2
2See Tucker, supra note 182, at 35 1-52.
273Milani, supra note 108, at 115 (citing S. REP. No. 101-116, at 15 (1989)).

2009]

TESTERS STANDING UP FOR TITLE HII OF THE ADA71

719

statute. Granting standing to ADA testers may help to solve the
problem. Perhaps all the nation needs is one highly publicized case in
which the defendant is forced to comply with the statute to encourage
voluntary compliance by businesses. The truth is there is currently
only a miniscule threat to businesses of a lawsuit under Title III, but if
business owners know testers can walk into their facilities looking for
violations, then they may start making choices to comply with the
statute. One attorney commented that "'.there is only one true
'the desire not to get sued and
incentive built in to [Title III]'
..

2 74
hav[e] to pay attorney's fees."'1

Tester standing may be the best option for protecting business
owners from expense. With the critiques of numerous scholars in the
field and the dim reality that things are not where Congress intended,
there is pressure on Congress to revisit the statute.27 If Congress is
forced to revisit the ADA, its solution may be to add a damage
remedy to Title 111. As originally proposed, Title III did contain such
a remedy, 7 but it was removed in an effort to protect businesses. 7
This compromise has been criticized by numerous scholars as the
downfall of Title 111278 and therefore may be the first place Congress
would turn to remedy the underenforcement of the statute. At the time
the ADA was enacted, Attorney General Dick Thornburgh recognized
that the damage remedy would have to be revisited, arguing that
279
Congress may have been too cautious in the remedy compromise.
In fact, many of those who have studied Title III have suggested that
Congress add a damage remedy for private suits as a means of solving
280
the severe underenforcement of the provision. Iadmge remedy
is added to Title 111, then businesses will be subject to greater
financial pressure. A damage remedy may also result in more abuse
of the statute, allowing some plaintiffs to settle out of court and leave
facilities inaccessible. Compared to this alternative, ADA tester
standing is a relatively minor issue for businesses.
Further, many believe that as a result of accessibility public
accommodations will receive increased business and revenue from

274Id. at 141 (citing The ADA Notification Act: Hearing on H.R. 3590 Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitutionof the H Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement
of Andrew D. Levy)).
275 See, e.g., Colker, supra note 10, at 411 ("Thie Tenth Anniversary [in 2000] of the ADA
provide[d] a good opportunity to assess the effectiveness of the ADA's remedies.").
276
1d at 383.
277Milani, supra note 108. at 115.
278See, e.g., Colker, supra note 10, at 377-78. See generally Bagenstos, supra note 6.
279 Kelly, supranote 177, at 366 (citing Colker, supra note 10, at 384).
2
80See, e.g., id. at 390-9 1.
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disabled clientele. 8 While there may be an initial expenditure,
making facilities accessible will not be a total loss for businesses. The
costs of complying with the statute are exaggerated as well. Those in
the disabled population are consumers, and access to the public
accommodations will result in increased commercial activity that will
help rather than harm the business owners.2 8
The main argument against tester standing is the financial strain on
small business owners. 8 The cases that have come into federal court,
however, are for the most part against large business enterprises like
hotel chains such as Ramada, cruise lines, and fast food chains such
as McDonald' S.2 84 It is hard imagine that Ramada lacks the finances
needed to put in a ramp or provide Braille on the elevators. In the end,
it seems that these corporations, and also small businesses for that
matter, are making a cost-benefit analysis and deciding that
complying with the statute to avoid being sued is not worth the
anticipated cost of compliance. This cost-benefit approach is also
troubling because the analysis done by business owners is arguably
skewed by prejudice and stereotypes against people with
disabilities."' However, Congress has already done this analysis and
decided accessibility is required.
While ADA testers are sometimes called "outside agitators" and
blamed for alleged attorney misconduct in filing what courts have
called frivolous lawsuits, 8 ADA testers and their attorneys are not
the monsters they are made out to be. First of all, these suits are
brought by the same attorneys over and over again not because the
attorneys are exploitative, but due to the lack of sufficient incentives
for other attorneys to bring these cases.2 8 The details of a Title III
lawsuit are complex and extremely contextual, so there is a high fixed
cost for lawyers to familiarize themselves with the rules.2 8 Further, it
is wrong to say that attorneys should not be seeking fees for their
281Colker, supra note 10, at 395 ("A restaurant that can serve customers who use
wheelchairs will also attain increased business, not only from individuals with disabilities, but
also from the friends and family of the individuals with disabilities.").
282 Id
283Larry E. Craig, The Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Prologue, Promise, Product, and
Performance, 35 IDAHO L. REv. 205, 222-23 (1999) (detailing cost data associated with ADA
compliance); Becker, supra note 105, at 96-98.
284See, e.g., Norkunas v. Wynn Resorts Holdings, LLC, No. 2:07-cv-00096-RLH-PAL,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77355 (D. Nev. Oct. 9, 2007); Wilson v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 426
F. Supp. 2d 1115 (S.D. Cal, 2006); D'Lil v. Best W. Encina Lodge & Suites, 415 F. Supp. 2d
1048 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev'd, 538 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2008); Clark v. McDonald's Corp., 213
F.R.D. 198 (D.N.J. 2003).
285Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 8.
2 6
8 dat25-26.
287
Id. at 13-14.
2
88Id. at 13.
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work on these tester cases. These businesses have violated the ADA
for over eighteen years, and the lawyer is an advocate for
accessibility. 28 9 Many of the attorneys represent non-profit
organizations whose sole purpose is to make America more accessible
for people with disabilities, 9 with improving access as their primary
motivation for filing lawsuits . 29 '1An attorney in Southern California
stated that, as a result of the numerous lawsuits he and his client had
filed, 1,100 additional parking spots for people with disabilities and
hundreds of ramps and rails were added to the defendants'
facilities. 9 As these violations continue, one writer has raised an
interesting question: "'.What difference does it make whether one
person with a disability files 300 lawsuits or whether 300 different
people with disabilities file one suit apiece?,, 293 Also, Congress
intended that this fee shifting would serve as an incentive for the
plaintiffs to bring the suits, and that is exactly what has happened. 9
In addition, a business can moot a Title III lawsuit by making the
necessary changes for compliance, and therefore preventing an
attorney from recovering fees or a plaintiff from recovering state

statutory damages or injunctive relief under Title

111.291

H. Supportfor Tester Standing: Wrongful JudiciaryFocus
The case law shows that courts apparently see ADA violation
claims as comparatively unimportant and instead focus on how many
cases are filed by the tester. But judges should not deny standing to
ADA testers based on concern about the burden on their docket. As
others have already noted, "[i]t is easy to see why ADA accessibility
cases might seem unimportant," especially due to the technical
requirements of the statute, which force a court to deal with issues
29

Id. at 18.

8

290See, e.g., Disabled Patriots of Am., Inc. v. Chagrin Retail, LLC, No. 1:07 CV 2363,

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91584, at *1-2 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 13, 2007) (attorney represented a
member of a non-profit organization that employed testers to seek out ADA violations);
Norkunas v. Wynn Resorts Holdings, LLC, No. 2:07-ev-00096-RLH-PAL, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 77355, at *2 (D. Nev. Oct. 9, 2007) (attorney represented Disabled Rights Action
Committee, a non-profit organization, and two of its members); Disability Advocates and
Counseling Group, Inc. v. 4SK, Inc., No. 6:04-cv-327-Orl-31JGG, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
44389, at * 1-2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2005) (attorney represented a non-profit corporation with
disabled members); Milani, supra note 108, at 134.
291Milani, supra note 108, at 134.
292

M. at 133.
293Becker, supra note 105, at 109 (quoting Email from Amy B. \Jandeveld, Attorney

(Mar. 8. 2005. 09:39 AM PST)).
194See
295

id

Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 11I(citing Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse
Doors to Civil Rights Litigants, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 537, 547 (2003)).
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that it believes to be better suited for local building inspectors .29
However, this does not change the fact that there is continual
violation of a federal statute that was meant to be an "'.emancipation

proclamation"'. 29 7 for the disabled population. Whether a class of
litigation is burdensome is more likely than not a "normative
assessment of the importance" of the lawsuit.2 9 The judiciary is not
supposed to assess the importance of a congressionally established
right. Standing should not depend on whether a judge feels the suit is
important, especially when there is reason to believe that those who
are disabled are "a discrete and insular minority" 2 99 Judges are
making an inappropriate judgment "of the importance of that
class." 300 Further, the "economic function of standing does not depend
on any particular philosophy about the nature of rights.",3 0 1 Further,
judges should not be deciding normative factual issues at the
summary judgment stage of litigation; these are issues that need to be
addressed after discovery and before the bench trial.30 (The requests
of defendants asking the courts to stop what the defendants deem
vexatious litigation is also something that may need to be addressed
by a change of law.) It is arguable whether there is a problem with the
numerous suits a few plaintiffs have brought in federal courts, but if
change is necessary it needs to come from Congress-courts should
not redraft the ADA and ignore congressional intent.3 0
CONCLUSION

No one can deny the importance of Title III for both individuals
with disabilities and the nation as a whole. Title III is a broad,
sweeping civil rights statute intended to remedy the seclusion faced
by those with disabilities. It is one way people with disabilities can
gain autonomy-an imperative American value. Title III was meant
to be Congress' solution to the pervasive problem of discrimination
against people with disabilities by places of public accommodation.
296

Bagenstos, supranote 6, at 23-24.
Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY
J. Ean'. & LAB. L. 19, 19 (2000) (quoting 136 CONG REC. S9689 (July 13, 1990) (statement of
Sen. Harkin)) (discussing the narrow interpretation courts have taken when it comes to the
employment titles of the ADA and the unfortunate results that have resulted from what the
author calls a "judicial backlash").
198Id. at 2 1.
2-942 U.S.C. § 12 101(a)(7) (2000) (amended 2008).
3
00Bagenstos, supra note 6, at 21 (citing Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil
Justice Reform: Miscasting the Problem, Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447,457 (2004)).
301Kontorovich, supra note 20, at 1692.
302
Colker, supra note 193, at I11 12.
3 3
0 Milani, supra note 108, at 132 (quoting Sharp v. Waterfont Rest., No. 99-CV-200 TW.
(AIB), 1999 WL 1095486, at *6 n.lI (S.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 1999)).
297Matthew
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The unfortunate reality is that Title III has fallen short of
expectations. While the statute grants broad standing rights and
Supreme Court precedent suggests an extensive interpretation of
standing in civil rights contexts, courts have created a huge wall that
numerous Title III plaintiffs cannot scale. Beyond the constitutional
standing requirements, numerous courts are focusing on the plaintiff s
motivation for bringing the lawsuit and denying standing based on an
interpretation of the plaintiffs intentions. Motivation is not an
element in the standing analysis created by the Supreme Court.
However, the result in courts that concentrate on motivation is that
meritorious cases are wrongfully dismissed and facilities remain
inaccessible.
Tester standing is the solution to the severe underenforcement
and continued willful violations of Title 111. It is congruent
with congressional intent and does not mean forcing public
accommodations out of business. Further, granting tester standing
does not require abandoning the Supreme Court's precedents set in
Lyons and Lujan, because the rulings of these two cases have been
misapplied and ADA tester cases are clearly distinguishable. In the
end, tester standing is more than just the lawfully correct application
of constitutional standing requirements. It is more than plaintiffs
having their day in court. It means hope for people with disabilities.
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